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Governance of energy transitions: about
inclusion and closure in complex
sociotechnical problems
Govert Valkenburg1* and Giancarlo Cotella2
Abstract
Background: When societies are faced with complex technological problems such as energy transitions, two basic
approaches to governance are usually mobilized. On the one hand, there are methods that emphasize the need for
enlarging the range of knowledge that is taken on board when decisions are to be made. On the other hand, there
are methods that emphasize the enrolment of a broader range of actors. In practice, these approaches conflate
uncritically, which fails to bring out the potential that each has for specific challenges. We investigate how these
two basic approaches can be brought together more systematically, in such a way that their potential vis-à-vis
specific challenges, including energy transitions, is maximized.
Methods: The article offers a conceptual exploration. Building on existing approaches, we offer a novel
conceptualization of how modes in the governance of complex technological problems can be classified, using
energy transitions as a strategic research site.
Results: We offer a typology of strategies built along two axes: the degree of closure, i.e. the extent to which
things can still be (re)negotiated and/or their actual implementation questioned, and the degree of inclusiveness, i.
e. the extent to which processes are open to all people, as opposed to for example merely policymakers or
technoscientific experts. Through the typology, we find four clusters spanned by these two dimensions, which each
call for specific governance strategies and each inform specific connections between the actor base and
knowledge base of intervention.
Conclusions: Important potentials for the governance of complex technological problems are currently left
untapped, if the actor and knowledge bases are unreflexively mobilized. The proposed framework helps realize
more of these potentials, by offering advice for how modes of governance with different degrees of closure and
inclusiveness can be mobilized.
Keywords: Governance, Complex sociotechnical problems, Energy transitions, Inclusion, Closure, Cognitive
inclusion, Actor inclusion
Background
The governance of complex processes, such as energy
transitions, large infrastructural projects or comprehen-
sive spatial planning issues, has hitherto largely been
approached along two lines. On the one hand, there have
been calls for a broadening of the knowledge base that in-
forms decisions, e.g. by enrolling other types of knowledge
than formal expertise, e.g. [1, 2]. On the other hand, there
are calls for the enrolment of additional actors than the
incumbent policymakers, technocrats and innovators, e.g.
[3, 4]. For example, it is argued that interest groups, local
communities and practitioners should be involved in
decision-making processes. In practice, these two classes
are of course conflated. However, it is our argument that
this conflation mostly happens in a too unreflexive way.
Therefore, we investigate how these two basic approaches
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way that their potential vis-à-vis specific challenges is
maximized.
We first analyse in more detail the sources of com-
plexity underlying these problems and the strategies that
existing literatures have offered to tackle them. Then, we
put together a conceptual framework that situates modes
of governance into an ordered field. This framework
builds on two dimensions: the degree to which new ac-
tors and new knowledges can be mobilized, or the level
of inclusiveness, and the degree to which knowledges,
technological designs and institutional arrangements be-
come stabilized, or the level of closure. These two di-
mensions span a field in which four basic quadrants can
be identified. For each of these quadrants, specific strat-
egies to dealing with the mobilization of both additional
actors and additional knowledges emerge as appropriate.
Thus, the following argument will contribute to the lit-
erature on governance of transitions—and complex
problems at large—a further sensitivity for the specific
constraints and affordances to which actors and their
knowledge are subject.
Methods
This paper presents a conceptual study. First, we offer
clarification of how complex problems emerge and face
policymaking. Then, we offer a brief literature review of
how governance studies have proposed to deal with
complex problems. We then point out through further
conceptual analysis that the existing approaches unduly
conflate epistemic or ‘knowledge-driven’ and agential or
‘action-driven’ approaches. At last, the newly explored
field is integrated with the knowledge-based part into a
single two-dimensional ordering.
Results
The nature of complex problems
Contemporary societies are replete with problems that are
complex. Complexity here refers to the fact that the prob-
lems defy standard solutions or standard strategies, and
they cannot be split into sub-problems for which standard
strategies would be available [5].1 As will become clear,
such complexity typically emerges because parts of the
problem are not independent, and solving one part of the
problem might thus deteriorate another part [6, 7]. As if
complex problems are not difficult enough to solve by
themselves, it typically does not make things easier if they
are to be managed in a democratic or democratically legit-
imate way [8].
Throughout this paper, we will regularly turn to energy
transitions as a specific version, and illustrative example,
of complex problems. We understand energy transitions
at a conceptual level as a set of structural changes in en-
ergy systems [9–11]. These structural changes are needed
since the system can no longer accommodate novel
elements and subsystems. At this point, the adaptation
capacity of the system becomes insufficient. When these
novelties are found to be desirable yet fail to fit into the
system, an overhaul of the whole system is needed.
As the changes constituting energy transitions concern
the system structure, they are highly consequential:
other subsystems may become obsolete as they become
poorly aligned with new system standards (they become
‘reverse salients’; see [12]). For example, a coal-fired
power plant takes some time to come online, longer
than, for example gas-fired plants. If the energy system
comes to incorporate more intermittent sources such as
wind and solar power, and if politico-economic circum-
stances dictate that these intermittent sources should be
prioritized over fossil power, then the flexibility required
from fossil power might not be possible to deliver by
coal-fired plants. This means that coal-fired plants are
rendered obsolete, even though they may not have
reached their economic life term. Such fundamental
changes abound in energy transitions.
Energy transitions epitomize complex governance prob-
lems, where complexity derives from many different is-
sues. First, energy transitions involve many different
actors, each with different interests, and different interpre-
tations of the transition goals [13]. Their economic and
political interests are typically tied up with the specific
positions they hold in the socio-economic and technical
system. For example, energy producers, for their market
position and their influence on policymaking processes,
depend on how exactly they have access to the energy
infrastructure. Similarly, citizens can only reduce their
dependency on big energy producers, if the overall energy
infrastructure can accommodate their own small-scale en-
ergy production sites, e.g. roof-mounted solar panels. This
is at once a technological, regulation and political prob-
lem. The dependency of such affordances and constraints
on infrastructures entails that competitive positions will
change if infrastructures change. This is one important
reason why alignment is challenging and why such struc-
tural changes are likely to meet resistance.
Second, energy transitions are complex because of the
heterogeneity of relevant values [14]. This is of course a
general phenomenon in contemporary, technological so-
cieties, but energy transitions are no exception. While
overall goals might enjoy broad endorsement, their spe-
cification into short-term goals and actions is subject to
value pluralism and contested prioritization of values.
This concerns goods underlying transitions such as en-
ergy security and sustainability, as well as a broader
range of social goods such as freedom of movement, se-
curity of subsistence and the exercise of democratic
rights. While these values are each legitimate in their
own right, they may each lead to different and conflict-
ing conclusions regarding how the energy infrastructure
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should be arranged and inform different and conflicting
perspectives on how short-term goals should be set [15].
Third, energy transitions are complex because of un-
certainties [11, 13]. On the one hand, this concerns fac-
tual and empirical knowledge: knowledge about how
energy systems function, especially in connection to
their socio-political and geopolitical context, is largely
incomplete. What makes things worse is that transitions
are an importantly future-oriented affair, and factual
knowledge about the future is even more uncertain. It is
as yet unknown what kind of energy technologies will be
successful in the future, how energy needs will exactly
be shaped, etc. Also, the influence of carbon emission on
climate change remains swayed by large margins of un-
certainty, which determines part of the urgency of en-
ergy transitions.2 3
On the other hand, these uncertainties concern nor-
mative knowledge about the future. This part is twofold:
as the future is unknown, it is not straightforward what
we should want for that future (let alone that we agree
on that), and it is also unclear what the most important
norms and values will look like in the future. This makes
the matter more complicated than mere value pluralism.
If we only disagree on values and their prioritization, the
solution typically consists of a political process through
which we arrive at a conclusion that can be accepted by
all, even under disagreement to the content. However, in
this case, the matter is subject to an epistemic challenge:
there are key things we do not know. This means that
there is uncertainty about the very object of discussion,
which means that the aforementioned political processes
become futile.
A fourth source of difficulty, also sharing an epistemic
nature, is that there is no linear and unambiguous rela-
tion between the production of knowledge and processes
of decision- and policymaking [16]. Policy choices are
based on more than just expert knowledge. They are
subject to contingent power relations, to processes of
agenda setting, etc. [17]. Also, reality is always more
complex than can be captured by knowledge, whether
expert knowledge or any other source of knowledge.
And finally, knowledge is constantly translated and
reframed whenever it circulates. Thus, decisions have an
input that is broader than only knowledge, and know-
ledge itself is often too ambiguous and heterogeneous to
inform decisions.
A fifth kind of complexity is a direct consequence of
complex social reality: with each and every change in
sociotechnical reality, new actors emerge and others dis-
appear from the stage. By consequence, it will similarly
differ between situations which knowledge is relevant;
no universal principles of knowledge inclusion are likely
to be found, beyond some very general principles of
democratic account and non-paternalism. Rather than
trying to devise democratic principles for the inclusion
of knowledge, the issue of mobilization of actors and dif-
ferent sorts of knowledge should be thought of as some-
thing that is performed and constructed time and again.
More than producing knowledge, it is a matter of posi-
tioning people. It is our contention that so far, citizens
have been too much addressed as an abstract and unruly
‘human factor’ [18]. Instead, more attention should be
paid to the substance of the roles they play [19] when
they act as a consumer, a protester, a voter, a tax-payer
and so on.
Thus, energy transitions are complex, heterogeneous,
long-term processes. What makes things worse is the fact
that such processes are inherently reflexive [16, 20, 21]: any
intervention made today will change the world of tomor-
row. This means that uncertainties do not simply add up
but reinforce each other exponentially. We do not know
how the future system will behave, since we cannot be en-
tirely sure what system we will build for the future. Given
the fundamental levels at which changes in energy transi-
tions take place, we are gradually de facto building new
sociotechnical systems, which means that it is not entirely
known how these future systems will behave. This holds a
fortiori for social reality. In practice, this reflexivity entails
that we cannot easily predict the exact social situation in
which future technologies will be embedded. This is not
only about social and institutional arrangements but also
about the whole axiological scale of private moral concerns,
habits and life-style-related norms, political ideologies, etc.
This reflexivity stands in a dialectic relation to what has
been referred to as recursiveness: the principle that struc-
ture is at once a means and a result of action [22]. While
the latter seems to suggest some form of stability, it is
through the former intrinsically prone to destabilization.
Uncertainty, occurring in many forms, is a precondi-
tion for modern life and any social activity. One specific
differentiation between sorts of uncertainty has been
dominant in informing a classification of policy prob-
lems. This classification takes uncertainty to occur on
two possible qualities of an issue. On the one hand,
there can be uncertainty with respect to the facts. In this
case, expertise could be consulted so as to reduce this
uncertainty. On the other hand, uncertainty can be situ-
ated at the normative level, if there is no clear position
on which value should be realized. In that case, political
and moral debate could possibly be conducted to come
closer to a consensus. If neither quality is particularly
ambiguous, one could speak of ‘puzzles’: these problems
are sufficiently structured and can be approached as im-
plementation problems for which a standard method is
available and of which the solution is principally within
reach. Quite the contrary, especially difficult or ‘wicked’
problems occur if uncertainty exists on both qualities.4
In that case, normative uncertainty renders controversial
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or ambiguous what kind of expertise should be enrolled
to solve the factual puzzles, and the factual uncertainty
renders unclear what the political debate should be con-
ducted about [23–25].
If problems score high on both the normative and the
factual qualities, they are unstructured, which means
they cannot be approached as puzzles for which stand-
ard methodologies are apt. These problems are termed
wicked problems. In practice, the wickedness of problems
may appear as the definition of the problem being am-
biguous. Also, there is no clear point at which the prob-
lem can be seen as solved nor an unequivocal solution
towards which effort can be made. With wicked prob-
lems, there is also no test site in which a manageable
version of the problem can be tried to solve. Usually,
there are no clearly good or bad answers, etc. [7].
This has been sketched in Fig. 1. In the upper right
quadrant, many problems have been identified over the
past decades that are subject to strong controversy and
contestation while uncertainties cannot as yet be re-
duced by scientific research. This is often the case of un-
certainties linked to energy security and transitions,
where the weakness of scientific evidence over long-
term issues such as peak oil and climate change impacts
hampers the reconciliation of opposite political positions
on various matters.
As briefly indicated above, complex problems become
particularly pressing if they are to be dealt with in a
democratically sound way. The notion of governance of-
fers a handle to start thinking through complex prob-
lems vis-à-vis contemporary, democratic societies. In the
following section, we will introduce the notion of gov-
ernance, particularly focussing on how it relates to com-
plex problems. We then move on to dissect two classes
of approaches to the governance of complex problems,
namely by enlarging the knowledge base and enlarging
the actor base.
Governance
With governance, we refer to the distributed constella-
tions that exercise power throughout society in order to
coordinate societal processes [26]. In its broadest sense,
governance includes all structuring that has societal con-
sequences and which is supported by some form of legit-
imation in terms acceptable to the people experiencing
those consequences (cf. [27]). It unites all those pro-
cesses that happen when people start taking control in a
collective way, whether through bottom-up or top-down
arrangements. We deliberately choose a comparably
wide notion of governance and do not restrict it for in-
stance to intentional action (cf. [28]), since that would
rule out exactly a number of modes of governance that
are essential to our argument.
In a general way, the notion of governance reflects the
recognition that bottom-up processes complement con-
ventional top-down modes of command and control,
without entirely replacing them [29, 30]. In practice,
processes of governance de facto present a balance be-
tween maintaining (central) public control over matters
and delegating decision and policymaking powers and
competences to other agents. These agents might be lo-
cated at the different territorial scales and both inside
and outside the public sector. Where the traditional no-
tion of ‘government’ referred to the control exercised
from within a polity’s institutions, ‘governance’ general-
izes this control and also includes all the forms of con-
trol that take place outside formal administrative
institutions. Straightforward examples of modes of gov-
ernance—or at least the part that falls outside political
and administrative institutions—are public debate, the
installation of market incentives, public education, self-
regulation of professional groups, etc. At a more philo-
sophical level, it can be argued that governance as an al-
ternative to government offers a reversal of the primacy,
from a top-down central government to a bottom-up ap-
proach [31].
Since the notion of governance vastly expands the
space in which decisions are taken, compared to conven-
tional notions of politics, both the range and heterogen-
eity of relevant bodies of knowledge proliferate. One
noteworthy kind of knowledge that now becomes salient
is knowledge that is generally reckoned to belong to pri-
vate life.5 Also, since technologies of many sorts offer
affordances and constraints to our lives, decisions under-
lying the design of those technologies are to be reckoned
part of governance.
Some authors present the idea of governance as add-
ing democratic quality to the government of a society
[32], or at least a recognition that bottom-up processes
are an important factor in the coordination of society.
Others contest these pro-democratic claims as being un-
critical and point out the blurred criteria of legitimacy
Fig. 1 The structure of policy problems (modified from [25])
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and accountability that the new governance beyond the
state often brings about [33–35].
Of course, ways of doing governance, or what we call
‘modes’, are manifold and heterogeneous. These modes
include the activities and institutions subsumed under
classical views of politics: political debate, legislation and
policymaking, jurisdiction, etc. But they also include
practices that are not traditionally reckoned part of pol-
itics: education and information, grass-root initiatives,
association, etc. The fact that governance thus includes
practices that are traditionally outside politics, it is no
longer straightforward how political principles function
vis-à-vis those generic modes of governance. Looking at
public debate and infrastructure specification, to men-
tion just two arbitrary examples, it remains a question
how they can be captured under the same denominator.
The notion of governance not only reflects the empir-
ical observation that decision-making is de facto not the
prerogative of formal institutions but also reflects that
societies are faced with problems that are, as outlined
above, too complex to be dealt with within those formal
institutions. This has been answered with new normative
perspectives on the societal management of complex
problems. Addressed challenges have included issues
such as value pluralism, uncertainty, contested expertise
and the changing role of the state [36–40]. Frameworks
such as post-normal science [1, 41, 42] and transition
management [22, 43] have aimed to solve parts of the
Gordian knots that puzzle complex, technological
societies.
Governing complex problems: knowledge and
experimentation
More in detail, for the governance of complex problems,
various innovative approaches have been suggested. As
we will show, these roughly fall apart in two categories.
On the one hand, there is the class of approaches that
see the policy problem as a knowledge deficit: the issue is
difficult, but if we could obtain further knowledge, we
would be able to cope with it better. On the other hand,
the complex problem can be approached as a lack of
control: we roughly know what is the case and where we
want to go, but we need better means of intervening.
An example of the emphasis on knowledge production
is the approach of post-normal science (PNS, [1]). It has
prescribed how wicked problems necessitate the expan-
sion of practices of knowledge production beyond trad-
itional forms of expertise. This ‘extended peer
community’ needs to include a broad range of stake-
holders, which are needed to bring a sufficiently wide
range of perspectives to bear on a particular problem.
This increases the democratization of complex problems
and their solution. This is to say that, through the exten-
sion of the peer community, the problem becomes
connected to a broader range of people, and the solution
likewise acquires a legitimacy that is carried by a broader
public. However, it is a democratization of a specifically
epistemic sort. While it accommodates the absorption of
knowledge put forward by broad ranges of audiences, it
does not explicitly engage with how those audiences can
be engaged and how these audiences can be made to see
themselves as carrying any responsibility for issues on
the table.
On the one hand, it is easy to see the value of bringing
in many different perspectives. In a most general sense,
it enlarges the range of possible solutions that become
available. Also, including the perspectives of citizens
who are in the end important actors in the effectuation
of transitions helps to ascertain that the solution will be
adapted to the context of implementation. Inclusion
understood as the inclusion of a sufficiently broad range
of perspectives on a problem, what could be called epi-
stemic inclusion, is important both from the perspective
of democratizing decisions and from the perspective of
capacitating actors to cope with complex problems. Of
course, the inclusion of a broad range of kinds of know-
ledge brings challenges of its own, and this is exactly
where the classification of the modes of governance de-
veloped in this paper offers more specified advice.
An approach such as PNS is indeed in principle open
to any sort of knowledge, including social and moral as-
pects. But this openness is at the same time a blind spot:
it does not per se help identify problems that are outside
the epistemic realm. A lack of knowledge is only part of
what makes this class of problems complex. Complex-
ities of geopolitics and markets are neither reduced by
expertise nor by debate. Also, as Guston [40] has noted,
seeking resolution within a mere epistemic realm would
be arrogating to (social) scientists the ability to deter-
mine what is good, as they will always be in a prioritized
position when it comes to adducing knowledge. Add-
itionally, not all sorts of knowledge can be expected to
be equally able to ‘speak truth to power’ and get their
particular truth staged and be heard by those in power.
As Adams et al. [17] pointed out, when aiming at influ-
encing policy- and decision-making through the produc-
tion of knowledge, individuals are more likely to be
successful when clustering more or less formally in
knowledge communities (may their nature be epistemic,
linked to a specific practice or set of values). This hints
at a need to further consolidate measures to grant
agency to relevant actors. It is our contention that ap-
proaching complex policy problems as knowledge prob-
lems is thus an incomplete approach, as challenges are
not always possible to reduce to a knowledge deficit,
whether normative or empirical.
On the other hand, there is the class of approaches to
complex problems that avow the inclusion of a broad
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range of actors and aim to attain a strategy by experi-
mentation. An example of such an experimentation style
of approaching complex problems is provided by transi-
tion management [16, 20, 21]. The approach is by no
means void of knowledge production, but emphasis is
on learning by doing, exactly because much relevant
knowledge is unattainable ex ante [13]. So-called (on a
side-note, poorly specified) frontrunners are to be en-
rolled [22, 44], and iteration in the sense of revising
short-term and mid-term goals in view of newly ac-
quired experiences is key. In a more general sense, this
type of approach is about activating people.
Both categories of approaches to complex problems pre-
sented above, i.e. those focussing on their epistemic nature
and those more specifically concerning with actors’ inclu-
sion, inform as to how specific governance arrange-
ments—modes of governance in our wording—may be
more effective than others in achieving specific outcomes.
As Treib et al. [45] review, modes of governance can be
classified with respect to the degree of coercion, the de-
gree of openness of implementation of decisions, the pres-
ence of sanctions, their involvement of actors, their
dependence on market mechanisms and some more.
Similarly, it has been suggested elsewhere that modes
of governance can be classified on a scale between ‘de-
liberative’ and ‘hierarchical’ [31]. While deliberative re-
fers to the further production of knowledges, and
hierarchical refers to a potential to determine action, we
contend that it is by no means given that these are op-
posed. (Even if the authors have meant this scale to refer
to governance more broadly without splitting so radic-
ally between knowledge production and intervention, it
still remains non-trivial why deliberative knowledge pro-
duction cannot go together in any way with centralized
management.) Rather, as we further argue in the follow-
ing sections, it is exactly the relation between them that
merits further development.
From experimenting and knowledge production to
inclusion and closure
It is worth noting that in most literature on governance
of complex problems, core notions are not always clearly
specified. For example, actors, stakeholders and fron-
trunners appear in theories without specifying who is to
be enrolled there. The high-school teacher? The mayor?
The utility contractor? It is hardly at this level that ac-
tors are specified. Exceptions are found in concrete case
studies, where relevant players are staged and labelled as
such, e.g. the two case studies by Rotmans and Loorbach
[22]. It appears though that in such case studies, the
classification of actors happens in hindsight, and it re-
mains unclear why exactly this actor is to play a particu-
lar role.
To a large extent, this is of course owing to exactly the
experimental nature of transitions and, more generally,
of the governance of complex problems: ambiguity about
who the relevant actors are is part of what makes things
complex. It is for this reason that we are just as much
fundamentally unable to specify ex ante how actors are
to be positioned and enrolled. What our framework aims
at though is offering a classification of modes of govern-
ance that entails particular actor roles. While it remains
impossible to identify actors beforehand, it at least fur-
ther sharpens the view by pointing out what is to be ex-
pected from them.
Before we can further develop this in the next section,
we need to argue the same here for the inclusion of a
broader range of knowledge. It is clear that scientific
knowledge, or even in a more general sense expert
knowledge which is predominantly modelled after the
criteria for natural-scientific knowledge [46], provides an
insufficient knowledge base to address all the intricacies
of complex problems. However, hardly any substantive
criterion for which knowledge is relevant is ever given.
Of course, ideas include that it is necessary for problem
definitions to resonate with the knowledge people hold
about an issue, for those people to feel responsible for
the issue. Hence, those people should be included in de-
fining the problem in the first place [18].
Again, this is hardly fair to criticize. Also, here, it is at
the basis of the very definition of complex problems that
it is impossible to tell ex ante which kinds of knowledge
need to be roped in. What is needed here is a specifica-
tion of what kind of role knowledge should play in a par-
ticular mode of governance.
In the following section, we further specify how spe-
cific roles can be expected from both actors and knowl-
edges. The conceptual move we make is in recognition
of the fact that specific modes of governance always
come with specific constraints and potentials.
Arranging governance
Our prior definition of governance, chiefly all those pro-
cesses through which control over the arrangement of
society is exercised, leaves unspecified what these pro-
cesses look like. We have already mentioned some clas-
sifications of modes of governance, which have been
suggested along various dimensions. In this light, we
propose to put together a classification of modes of gov-
ernance along two dimensions that allow for both an
epistemic and an agential specification: their level of in-
clusiveness and their level of closure.
The first dimension is to capture the extent to which
modes of governance are socio-spatially distributed and
mobilize agency of a broad variety of actors. This level of
inclusiveness is low if only institutional and political ac-
tors matter and high if the general audience and market
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players etc. matter as well. Political debate in parliament is
a fairly exclusive, centralized affair. So are taxes, since there
is only one authority that executes them. In contrast, grass-
root initiatives, interest groups and public information are
much more distributed and hence inclusive. They are ac-
cessible to many or all citizens, and their execution or effec-
tuation is importantly done by many. (Note that these are
not empirical claims, but just conceptual explications, or
tautologies if one likes—we just recite what is generally
meant with parliamentary debate, interest groups, etc.)
Note that this level of inclusiveness is at once epi-
stemic and agential. Also, there is a correlation (but not
a strict identity) between the two domains: practices that
are inclusive in terms of participation are also likely to
be inclusive of a broader range of knowledge than less
inclusive practices [47, 48]. Similarly, if exclusion is exer-
cised, it is very conceivable that unfitness of specific
knowledges is mobilized as a justification (there is of
course a large literature on such forms of ‘boundary
work’, starting with Gieryn [49]). This correlation is not
conclusive. This somewhat fuzzy mapping and confla-
tion of the epistemic and agential dimensions of govern-
ance is done deliberately so as to leave some flexibility
in its use. We find it unproblematic for the current argu-
ment, but further specification might be an interesting
avenue for follow-up research.
If a mode of governance scores higher on the dimen-
sion of inclusion, it may count as more democra-
tic—though this of course depends on the exact criteria
for democracy one holds dear [50]. The idea of inclusion
involves the enrolment of citizens in effectuation of a
policy, as well as their knowledges pertinent to that pol-
icy. It involves citizens’ access to the institutions where
the policy is created and implemented, and their possi-
bilities to get their voices heard. It includes the extent to
which something pertains to all members of society.
And it includes the degree to which things are physically
distributed and pervasive through society. Thus, this dis-
tribution is comparably intuitive and leaves intact some
underlying heterogeneities and ambiguities. (Also, again,
the explanation is largely conceptual and tautological,
not empirical.)
The second dimension by which we group modes of
governance is the level of closure. This captures the extent
to which propositions, in terms of their (re)definition and/
or implementation, are open to negotiation or instead
have closed down and become inevitable. This level of
closure is high if things are settled, when arrangements
become institutionalized, and decisions are binding. It is
low if decisions can still be debated and contested and for
example when the effectuation of decisions remains
dependent on voluntary action. Closure can occur in the
discursive sphere [51], as well as in institutional arrange-
ments [52] and in technological design [53].
Political debate, conducted within the confines of pol-
itical institutions, has in itself a low degree of closure,
but closure may occur the moment political debate leads
to the production of laws and other authoritative policies
and ultimately the coercion of decisions taken. In com-
parison, public debate has the same low degree of clos-
ure, but getting from public debate to closed-down
decisions is far less straightforward. It may generate new
ideas and perspective, it may generate support for a par-
ticular case, and it may in the end breed acceptance for
laws to be adopted, but in itself, it is not able to issue
binding rules. This difference not least relates to the dif-
ference between the two on the other dimensions: the
two modes differ greatly on the level of inclusiveness.
The level of closure is largely antonymous to the
agency people and institutions have: the more things are
fixed and closed down, the less there is to choose and
change to effectuate. The concern underlying this paper
was that agency was largely underdeveloped in the gov-
ernance approaches we discussed. The arrangement of
modes of governance in Fig. 2 shows that this two-
dimensional approach is indeed necessary to do justice
to the orthogonality between inclusion and closure: one
cannot be reduced to the other, and a mode scoring high
on one dimension does not necessarily score high on the
other.
Following distinctions along these two dimensions, a
collection of modes of governance—by no means
intended to be comprehensive—was arranged in Fig. 2.
In tandem, these two dimensions produce a field in
which the complete range of modes of governance can
be charted. As will become clear onwards, this classifica-
tion allows for engaging at once with how agency of in-
dividual actors is arranged and with the inclusion of
heterogeneous forms of knowledge.
This classification of modes of governance helps to
chart the territory in which agential and epistemic inclu-
sion are to be pursued. With different modes come dif-
ferent levels of inclusiveness and closure, which
importantly determines how issues are circulated, how
actors show agency, how actors are positioned in power
relations and how outcomes are never merely deter-
mined by knowledge positions. Only with sufficient sen-
sitivity towards these constraints and affordances can it
be possible for the citizen to be incorporated and mobi-
lized in dealing with complex problems, as for instance
energy transitions.
If we divide the field in four quadrants, and realize
that the main challenges of achieving energy transition
are both epistemic and agential, then the following four
strategies can be devised (see Fig. 3). In the lower left
corner, we find chiefly those modes of governance that
are closely related to institutional politics in its conven-
tional sense. We have termed it ‘government’ here
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because that most exemplarily catches the character, but
of course, it is slightly broader than what government lit-
erally refers to. While inclusiveness in the sense of get-
ting citizens to participate is not directly relevant here,
all the more attention could be paid to having the
process epistemologically inclusive, as this is not self-
evidently the case. That is to say, mainstream politics
could aspire to mobilize the methods from policy studies
discussed above, so as to curate a richer knowledge base
upon which decisions are to be made. It is a known
complaint [54] that in these spheres, discourses are too
much limited to economic and technological/techno-
cratic vocabularies. In this corner, the earlier lessons
learned from post-normal science could be deployed.
In the upper left corner, inclusiveness is high and clos-
ure is low. We have termed it ‘crowd sourcing’, referring to
practices where many supporters each contribute a small
bit to a common goal. For the purpose of this argument,
such contributions must be thought to include both
knowledge and action. In this quadrant, epistemological
inclusiveness is not very problematic: different sorts of
knowledge can in principle be adopted or at least to the
extent that a given society is able to perform such inclu-
sion. Similarly, no fundamental hurdles may stand in the
way for agential inclusion. It is more likely that agential in-
clusion will take place if the epistemic inclusiveness is
more emphasized: if people are explicitly invited to voice
their definitions of problems and the opportunities they
see for solution. This all is not to say though that inclusion
is straightforward or would not require work. It just says
that the low level of closure poses few or no limits to it.
The upper right corner is termed collective action. In
this corner, both inclusiveness and closure are high.
Here, things really depend a bit more on where the clos-
ure has taken place. If it is largely epistemic, then mobil-
izing further knowledge production might not that
productive, and more action-oriented inclusion might be
prioritized. Conversely, if closure has taken place in the
technical and action domain, then inclusion into know-
ledge production might help to create common ground.
It is not self-evident that this will happen, and Caiati et
al. [55] show that particularly, those projects are success-
ful that actually pay attention to the work that needs to
be done to align new practices and cognitive frameworks
with existing frames held by citizens.
In the lower right corner, finally, we find the activity of
‘infrastructuring’. The notion of infrastructure has of
course many meanings across a vast range of literatures
and even within this article, but here, we refer to those
Fig. 2 A two-dimensional classification of conventional modes of governance (original)
Fig. 3 Four types of modes of governance (original)
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elements that organize interactions in society over a lon-
ger time and in doing so go by unnoticed. These elements
might not only be technological structures but also prac-
tices that are fixed in place and institutions of various
sorts. In building such infrastructures, inclusiveness is low
but closure is high. In other words, it is not granted that
citizens will have access to these particular processes of
governance, and if they have access, it is not given that
they can exert any substantial influence, since the course
of affairs is already largely determined—whether in the al-
lowable repertoire of action or in the possible contestation
of knowledge. In some natural sense, these modes of gov-
ernance are therefore not so relevant for citizens. They are
just there, hence the term ‘infrastructuring’. However, as
both high closure and low inclusiveness render these modes
of governance highly influential for the organization of soci-
ety, they provide an important site where arrangements can
be made that engender both epistemological and agential
inclusiveness in the other quadrants. Examples are develop-
ing infrastructures such that they remain open to socio-
technical experimentation (agential inclusiveness) and
organizing governmental institutions such that a wide array
of knowledge can be incorporated (epistemic inclusiveness).
Discussion
Energy transitions are pervasive phenomena that en-
trench societies both along technological and along
socio-political and economic lines. Consequently, an ut-
terly heterogeneous range of kinds of knowledge is sali-
ent to the problematics, as is the broadest range of
relevant actors. The above argument has offered a sys-
tematic way to classify the substantive ways in which the
relevance of these kinds of knowledge and relevant ac-
tors can play out. It thus fleshes out more of the ‘learn-
ing’ strategy that is often taken too much at face value in
dealing with the management of transitions. Such a sys-
tematic approach is a necessary addition to the hitherto
uncritical conflation of actor and knowledge.
The argument has been largely conceptual, which
means it could be further corroborated with empirical
study. Such a study could for example investigate,
through anthropological and other qualitative methods,
how both closure and inclusiveness (or their counter-
parts, contestation and exclusion) are achieved in prac-
tices of governance. Also, further policy analysis could
be conducted into how the trajectory of issues, from
problem definition to implementation of a solution (or
failure thereof ) maps onto the field sketched above.
Conclusions
Lessons for governing complex issues
Underlying the proposed argument is a recognition that
the inclusion of knowledges as well as actors, when it
comes to governance of complex problems such as energy
transitions and others, has hitherto been assumed too un-
critically. By consequence, the conflation of epistemic and
agential inclusion has merited further attention. The field
of modes of governance we proposed above helps
operationalize the idea that the solution of complex prob-
lems requires that multiple perspectives are brought to
bear on the very problem. We solve the problem indir-
ectly: not by making more specific which actors and
knowledges should be included and how, but by articulat-
ing what might be realistic expectations given the relative
position of a mode of governance vis-à-vis other modes.
Also, how these two dimensions of inclusion and clos-
ure play out has been differentiated for modes of
governance.
Further research
It is to be hoped that this approach, of arranging modes
of governance in the field spanned by the level of inclu-
sion and the level of closure, can be developed further.
Underlying the whole approach to the mobilization of
citizens is that attention must be paid not only to epi-
stemic and agential inclusion but also to the extent to
which these are facilitated or constrained by the particu-
lar mode of governance. This also sheds a particular
light on issues of legitimacy and accountability. One
follow-up question would be how each of the four quad-
rants should be more explicitly related to the production
of legitimacy of decision-making and of accountability
for the decision taken.
Finally, this production of engagement, legitimacy and
accountability must be connected more explicitly to the
ideas of learning that are central to existing approaches
to governance of complex issues, which in turn are
strongly connected to the notion that such processes are
highly reflexive processes. If reflexive systems (whether
technical or social) indeed change their own fundamen-
tals, they render the prediction of their future behaviour
unpredictable. The production of engagement, legitim-
acy and accountability are themselves interventions in
the sociotechnical system and reflexive at that. The
current article aims at mobilizing learning processes to
deal with this reflexivity.
Endnotes
1As one reviewer rightly pointed out, a distinction is
often found in the literature between ‘complicated’ and
‘complex’ problems (see, e.g. [56]). The former refers to
problems where scale and heterogeneity necessitate the
involvement of, and coordination between, different types
of expertise. Despite these difficulties, such problems are
ultimately reducible to smaller sub-problems, and solu-
tions are repeatable between similar cases. Complex prob-
lems, on the other hand, are not reducible, and solutions
are not reproducible. These problems emerge in evolving
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and adaptive systems. While we think this distinction
should not be at the core of our argument, we will expli-
cate relevant aspects when needed.
2This claim is of course not meant to represent a ‘cli-
mate-sceptic’ stance but just to emphasize that the fu-
ture is fundamentally uncertain.
3At this point, it could be argued, in line with endnote
1, that these are largely coordination issues that make
transitions a complicated problem, not a complex prob-
lem. However, we contend that these interactions be-
tween parts of the process make the process importantly
irreducible, which makes the process complex, not only
complicated.
4Prior definitions of wicked problems by, e.g. Rittel
and Webber [7] and Termeer, Dewulf, and Breeman [36]
use different specifications, but the overall characteris-
tics of the current class of problems are much alike.
5For a further discussion of the relation between
knowledge and power, check the ‘Territorial knowledge
channels’ framework developed by Adams, Cotella and
Nunes [17].
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